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1.1. Mobile ad hoc network (MANET)
An adaptive, self-conﬁgurable and self-organizing multi-hop
wireless network devoid of infrastructure along with the ran-
dom topology is termed as MANET. Through this deﬁnition,it is revealed that the network can be created, combined or
partitioned into detached networks depending on the require-
ments of the network. Also ad hoc network can be set up
quickly without any base station for wireless cellular networks.
The routes among the end-users have a multi-hop wireless
links in this network. Besides the above features, the ad hoc
network has a capacity to move autonomously [1,2].
1.1.1. Self-organized MANET
The entirely self-organized mobile ad hoc network is devoid of
any kind of online or ofﬂine authority. The end-users gener-
ated this network in ad hoc mode. As the relationship among
the users is not recognized priorly, the user does not share
common keys with their nodes. Thus without depending on
the common ofﬂine trusted authority TTP, users have to build
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tion of network. The authority-based MANET holds up the
applications, which insist the utility of ofﬂine authority. The
nodes related to the authority-based ad hoc networks include
priorly established relationships when compared to fully self-
organize ad hoc networks. The trusted authority is responsible
for offering the cryptographic keying material and set of sys-
tem parameters for each node before formation of the net-
work. Each node will turn out to be self-authority and
further distributes the certiﬁcates to the nodes in transmission
range following the formation of the network [1].
1.2. Security in MANET
The MANET security is categorized into following types:
(1) The security model depending on TTP in which the cer-
tiﬁcates are issued using a single authority such as Public
Key Infrastructure (PKI).
(2) The completely self-organized model in which the secu-
rity is not based on trusted authority or ﬁxed server.
This is similar to security models based on trust propa-
gation via trust graph like PGP [3,13].
1.2.1. Self-organized key management
Self-organized key management technique is categorized into
following two groups:
(1) Virtual CA (Certiﬁcate Authority): This technique con-
siders that there exists a certiﬁcate authority called
TTP. Virtual CA offers high-level guarantees and does
not necessitate warm-up time. The main issue concerned
with this group is related to selection of Certiﬁcate
Authority (CA) and overcoming attacks in CA, which
is caused by malicious users.
(2) Web-of-trust: This group does not necessitate CA,
which reveals that it is more ﬂexible. However, it is
affected by recurrent communication and more memory
spaces as it should gather public-key certiﬁcates in
advance. It needs more time to gather all the certiﬁcates
in the network due to that reason of exchanging the
repository among moving users in periodical manner [4].
1.3. Certiﬁcate chaining approach
When two nodes desire to interact in secured manner, they
exchange public keys with each other using the technique that
veriﬁes and signs packet in each hop of the network. This tech-
nique is termed as certiﬁcate chaining which involves the sign-
ing of the key exchange packets by each hop and veriﬁcation of
the signature by the next hop. The merit of this approach is
that it permits the transmission of the public keys to the desti-
nation in the secured way [5].
1.3.1. Essential functions of certiﬁcate chaining approach
1. Mitigating the Certiﬁcate and Private Key Compromise:
Due to the cooperation of the private key/certiﬁcate, the
malicious attacker utilizes these certiﬁcates to initiateman-in-middle attacks. This can be prevented using the cer-
tiﬁcate chaining approach in which every node guarantees
the originality of the certiﬁcate.
2. Setting Model for Future Extension: For mitigating attacks
on availability criteria, the certiﬁcate chaining approach
plays a major role. For example, the trust management sys-
tem employs certiﬁcate-chaining approach for detecting the
ﬂooding attacks [5].
Mainly the certiﬁcate chaining approach is appropriate for
self-organized MANET that permits the users to generate,
accumulate, distribute and revoke their own public keys with-
out the help of trusted authority [6].
1.3.2. Limitations of existing certiﬁcate chaining
The current certiﬁcate chaining approach exhibits the follow-
ing limitations:
1. No assurance to the public keys authentication. Certainly,
the certiﬁcate chaining among two nodes is possibly not
established.
2. There is a requirement of extensive time until the web-of-
trust is set up among each other.
3. The predicted results in this scheme will not be precise since
it is not based on TTP. The nodes act as individual CA and
consequently the certiﬁcate chain will depend on the nodes
honesty concerned with the formation [7].
1.4. Problem identiﬁcation
The drawbacks of the existing approaches are as follows:
In [8], the proposed technique to cope with misbehaving
node does not prevent users from creating virtual identiﬁers
or from stealing the identity of people who do not participate
in the network. Also exploration of more sophisticated load-
balancing/data management schemes for public-key manage-
ment is not handled.
In [2], the author has not discussed the authentication
parameters.
In [6], the proposed technique lags certiﬁcate revocationmeth-
odology. Also authentication parameters are discussed in detail.
In [9], they have only assumed that every node in a
MANET ﬁrst generates a public/private key pair.
From the existing works done so far we can come to know
that there is a requirement of strong self-certiﬁed key genera-
tion and certiﬁcate exchange mechanisms along with some
trusted model.
So, we propose a Self-Organized Key Management with
Trusted Management in MANET. Our approach includes
three phases, which are as follows:
 Phase 1––Creation of Public/Private Key Pairs.
 Phase 2––Trust Management Mechanism.
 Phase 3––Certiﬁcate Exchange Technique.
2. Literature review
Some of the existing self-organization key management
approaches are as follows:
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management system based on trust graphs and threshold cryp-
tography. Their system is based on a trust graph where they
utilized threshold cryptography scheme. This scheme refuses
the malicious nodes that offer false public key certiﬁcates
defrauding the certiﬁcation service. They utilized certiﬁcate-
chaining approach for carrying out authentication and permit-
ting the users to issue the public key certiﬁcates.
Kawabata et al. [2] have proposed a self-organized key
management based on trust relationship list scheme that does
not rely on any trusted authority or ﬁxed server in the ad hoc
networks. Each node manages the certiﬁcate created by them
and when the certiﬁcation is required, node gathers the certif-
icates from other nodes by verifying the list of trust relation-
ship. By using trust relationship list, they minimized the
amount of communications and memory used.
van der Merwe et al. [10] have proposed a trustworthy key
management for mobile ad hoc networks (AdHocTKM). They
utilized threshold cryptography and certiﬁcate chaining tech-
nique that integrates the self-certiﬁed public keys and self-cer-
tiﬁcates to yield a key management service. They proposed a
threshold self-certiﬁed public keying technique that allows
cooperation among a single entity and a distributed authority
for an implicit self-certiﬁed public key, without the authority
gaining knowledge of the corresponding private key.
Capkun et al. [4] have proposed a fully self-organized public
key management scheme for mobile ad hoc networks. In this
technique, the users generate the public/private key pairs and
issue certiﬁcates for executing authentication without consider-
ing the network partitions and centralized services. Though the
security is performed in a self-organized manner, the key
authentication among two users is achieved with local informa-
tion. Their proposed local repository construction algorithm
attains high performance on a wide range of certiﬁcate graphs.
Dahshan et al. [7] have proposed an on demand self-orga-
nized public key management for MANETs. Each user gener-
ates its own public/private key, issues the certiﬁcates to the
neighbor nodes and executes the public key authentication
devoid of any centralized authority. Their scheme is based on
the presence of the web-of-trust among mobile nodes forming
the network. Also they executed the certiﬁcate chain discovery
technique with the help of routing process. There scheme greatly
reduces the communication cost as the every node limits its
search for the certiﬁcate chain to its directly trusted nodes only.
van der Merwe et al. [11] have proposed fully self-organized
peer-to-peer key management for mobile ad hoc networks.
They utilized sub-ordinate public keys and crypto-based iden-
tiﬁers for eradicating any form of trusted third party. They
used a localized certiﬁcate exchanges on the network for
breaking the routing-security interdependence cycle without
degrading the performance of the network. Their scheme is
more generic as it can be applied over mobile wireless network
inclusive of symmetric or asymmetric encryption.
Sen et al. [9] have proposed a robust and efﬁcient key
exchange protocol for node authentication in a MANET based
on multi-path communication. The proposed key exchange
protocol can be integrated with routing protocol. The protocol
is based on the multi-path communication and hence it is
robust even in the presence of malicious nodes in the network.
Moreover, it has a minimal computation and communication
overhead.Ibriq and Mahgoub [14] have presented a hierarchical key
establishment scheme called HIKES. In this scheme, the base
station acts as the central trust authority and the randomly
selected sensors act as local trust authorities authenticating
the cluster members and issuing private keys. It uses a partial
key escrow scheme that enables any sensor node selected as a
cluster head to generate all the cryptographic keys needed to
authenticate other sensors within its cluster. It localizes secret
key issuance and reduces the communication cost with the base
station. It provides an efﬁcient broadcast authentication in
which source authentication is achieved in a single transmis-
sion and a good defense for the routing mechanism.
Chen et al. [12] have proposed a lightweight and provably
secure user authentication scheme with anonymity for the
GLOMONET. It uses only symmetric cryptographic and hash
operation primitives for secure authentication. Apart from
this, it takes only four message exchanges among the user, for-
eign agent and home agent. They have also demonstrated that
the protocol provides the security attributes including preven-
tion of various attacks, single registration, user anonymity,
user friendly, no password/veriﬁer table, and use of one-time
session key between mobile user and foreign agent.3. Self-organized key management with trusted certiﬁcate
exchange
3.1. Overview
The proposed architecture consists of the coordinator node,
servers and ordinary mobile nodes. The coordinator node
acts as a mediator for transmitting the message among the
servers and mobile nodes. Each node generates its own
public/private key pairs using server-signed public keying
technique. The coordinator node helps in generating the
publicly-recoverable public key for any node Ni without the
knowledge of the subsequent private key. The coordinator
node acts as a distributed trusted authority. It combines the
shares of (t+ 1) servers for computing signature parameter.
The nodes in the network are validated using the trust man-
agement mechanism. The trust value is computed using the
Eigen Vector Reputation Centrality. This certiﬁcate exchange
technique helps the nodes to authenticate themselves with the
members in the network before they get joined and start
accessing the network resources. As a result of multiple
independent certiﬁcations, the conﬁdence assigned to the
certiﬁcates is higher.
3.2. Proposed architecture
Our architecture consists of the coordinator node, servers and
normal mobile nodes. One coordinator is chosen, as the dis-
tributed trusted authority. Fig. 1 shows the proposed architec-
ture of the self-organized key management technique of the
MANET. It includes the ordinary nodes (N1,N2, . . . ,N10),
where N4 is chosen as the coordinator node (Nc). There are 4
servers {z1,z2, . . . ,zn}. The coordinator acts as a mediator node
for transmitting messages from normal mobile nodes to the
servers.
The proposed technique includes four phases that are
described in the following section.
Figure 1 Architecture of the self-organized key management
technique.
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This phase involves the generation of public/private key pairs
(Kpu, Kpr) using server-signed public keying technique. This
technique allows the users to generate their own public/private
key pairs. The system consists of n servers (z1,z2, . . . ,zn) and a
trusted coordinator node. The coordinator node sends a secret
value to the corresponding node which requires a public/pri-
vate key generation. The receiver node sends back a newly gen-
erated secret value for getting the signature parameter.
The coordinator node acts as a distributed trusted author-
ity. It combines the shares of (t+ 1) servers for computing sig-
nature parameter. Consider that coordinator node selects the
primes x, k with k|x  1, a generator d of a multiplicative sub-
group of Zx with order k. Let h(Æ) denotes a one-way hash
function and Ni denotes any node in the network. The coordi-
nator node publishes x, k, d and h. The steps involve in the
generation of public/private key pairs are as follows:
 Step 1: After selecting its random number k0Ni 2R Zk, coor-
dinator node computes the secret value (using Eq. (1)).
C0Ni ¼ dðk
0NiÞ ð1ÞThe computed secret value is transmitted to Ni.
 Step 2: After selecting its random number q 2R Zk, Ni com-
putes the secret value (using Eq. (2)).
CNi ¼ C0Ni dq ð2Þ
After the above computation of secret value, Ni then transmits
its own ID and secret (IDNi,CNi) again to Nc.
 Step 3: The coordinator node forwards the (IDNi,CNi) to
each server.
 Step 4: Each server computes the hash function of (IDNi, -
CNi), which is represented as h[(IDNi,CNi)]. Then it com-
putes its threshold signature, i.e. Signl [Zi, h[(IDNi,CNi)]]
to coordinator node.
 Step 5: Coordinator node collects all the t+ 1 shares from
the servers and computes the signature parameter SignNi
(using Eq. (3)) and forwards both SignNi and Signl
[h[(IDNi,CNi)]] to Ni.
SignNi ¼ h½ðIDNi;CNiÞ þ k0Ni ð3Þ Step 6: Then Ni computes the private key kpr (using Eq. (4))kpr ¼ SignNi þ q ð4Þ
The tuple (CNi,kpr) can be viewed as the signature of the DTA
on IDNi.
 Step 7: After verifying the signature, Ni computes the corre-
sponding public key kpu (using Eq. (5)) and publishes CNi
and IDNi. kpu of Ni is publicly veriﬁed by decrypting Signl
[h[(IDNi,CNi)] using the public key of the coordinator node,
comparing the decrypted hash value to [h(IDNi,CNi)] and
evaluating Eq. (5).
kpu ¼ dkpr ¼ dðIDNi;CNiÞ  CNi ð5Þ
The above approach assists the users to fully control the
security settings of the system.
3.2.2. Phase 2: Trust management mechanism
The trust management mechanism is employed in order to val-
idate the nodes in the network. The trust value is computed
using the Eigen Vector Reputation Centrality Mechanism
[12]. Each node deployed in the network computes the Eigen
vector centrality (EVCi) of its neighbors (using Eq. (6)) for
exhibiting the reputation and level of conﬁdence on each
neighbor.
Let ni and nj be the adjacent nodes. The centrality for the ith
node is proportional to the sum of the scores of all nodes that
are linked to it.
EVCi ¼ 1d
X
j2SðiÞ
EVCj ¼ 1d
Xn
j¼1
RijEVCj ð6Þ
where Rij is the adjacency matrix of the network, S(i) is the set
of nodes that are connected to the ith node, n is the total num-
ber of nodes and d is the constant.
Rij is deﬁned in Eigen vector centrality using the following
condition:
If
ith node is adjacent to the jth node
Then
Rij = 1 (In eigen-vector centrality)
Else
Rij = 0
End if
S.P John, P. SamuelA node N computes F(i, j) and E(i, j). F(i, j) is deﬁned as the
percentage of packets initiated from ni which were forwarded
by nj over the total number of packets offered to nj. E(i, j) is
deﬁned as the percentage of packets that were expired over
the total number of packets offered to node j. Each node peri-
odically computes its connectivity rating (recent satisfaction
index (RSI)) with each of its direct neighbor nodes using the
above computed percentages (using Eq. (7)).
RSIij ¼ Fði; jÞ  Eði; jÞ ð7Þ
RSIij is weighted into the direct reputation of node j which is
shown in Eq. (8).
Trij ¼ Trij-prgþRSIijð1 gÞ ð8Þ
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utation value that node i had for node j before inclusion of
RSIij, g is the constant that exhibits level of conﬁdence con-
tained by ni in the past for nj.
If
There is no link among ni and nj,
Then
Trij is reduced using b instead of g
End if (where b is a constant that reduces the trust value)Trij is normalized (using Eq. (9)), by examining it over time t.
Trij ¼ EVCi
Trij
fðtÞmaxðTrijÞ
ð9Þ
f(t)max is the function that reports about the maximum Trij
over time t.
Trmin represents the minimum threshold value of trust. The
trust value depends on the eigen vector centrality score and the
recent satisfaction index. A normal node must have a trust
value Trij, higher than the threshold minimum Trmin, of the
network (i.e. Trij > Trmin).
3.2.3. Phase 3: Certiﬁcate exchange technique
The certiﬁcate exchange technique helps the nodes to authen-
ticate themselves with the members in the network before they
get joined and start a new communication. In order to enhance
the reliability of certiﬁcate exchange protocol, Multi-path
Technique is utilized. During the multi-path certiﬁcate
exchange, the public key of a node is certiﬁed by the different
nodes. As a result of multiple independent certiﬁcations, the
conﬁdence assigned to the certiﬁcates is higher. Moreover,
the authentication is performed mutually.
Let S and D represent the source and destination
respectively.
Let Ni represents the intermediate nodes.
Let kpud be the public key of D.
Let kpus be the public key of S.
Let T(S) be the set of nodes certiﬁed for kpus.
Let REQcert represents the certiﬁcate request message.
Let REPcert be the certiﬁcate reply message.
Let Cself be the self-signed certiﬁcate.
Let IDD be the identity value of D.
Let CL be the certiﬁcate list.
When S receives kpud, it issues a certiﬁcate for that public
key. Consequently, D issues a certiﬁcate for kpus. Each node
in T(S) contains its public key certiﬁed by S since the authen-
tication is mutual. The steps involved in the certiﬁcate
exchange process are as follows:
Step 01: S broadcasts REQcert containing IDD and T(S) for
D’s certiﬁcates.
S !REQcertþIDD Neighbor nodes ð10ÞThis REQcert is sent with a minimum time to live (TTLmin) for
minimizing the communication overhead of the protocol.Step 02: When Ni receives the REQcert, it veriﬁes kpus and
checks its own CL.
If
(Ni has no certiﬁcate for D) | | (Ni has already replied to the
REQcert)
Then
Ni forwards the REQcert to its neighbor nodes
Else
Ni feedbacks REPcert to S that contains the certiﬁcate of kpud
signed by Ni
End ifStep 03:
If
Ni is unaware of S,
Then
Ni constructs a Cself and notiﬁes S that it wants to make a
certiﬁcate exchange which is performed via a multiple node-disjoint
paths.
End ifStep 04:
If
Ni already has a route to D in its cache,
Then
Ni informs D that S has requested its kpud.
D responds to query and requests a certiﬁcate for kpus.
End ifSince Ni and D can authenticate each other, the communica-
tion among the D and Ni is made secured using Ni’s signature.
Hence there is no possibility for any node to corrupt the certif-
icate of S which is issued by Ni.
Step 05:
If
D is unaware of adequate number of nodes,
Then
D replies to REQcert itself.
End ifStep 06: S repeats the above process by increasing the TTL
value until it obtains the minimum number of certiﬁcates
for kpud.
Step 07: S then calculates the trust value Trij of the nodes
included in the all offered paths.
Step 08: S considers only those paths, which are free from
malicious nodes.
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that is having more certiﬁers of the destination node D.
Step 10: S then forwards the ﬁrst packet to D that contains
the set of nodes that has offered the certiﬁcates for kpud.
Step 11: Once they have exchanged their public keys, S and
D issue certiﬁcates for each other.
Due to multiple independent certiﬁcations, the conﬁdence
assigned to these certiﬁcates is higher. For example, consider
Fig. 2. We demonstrate our certiﬁcate exchange mechanism
by considering N5. S broadcasts the REQcert to its neighbor
nodes. When N5 receives the message, it checks its CL. If
N5 does not know D or it has already sent the REPcert, then
it just forwards it to next node N6. Otherwise, N5 replies with
REPcert that contains the certiﬁcate of kpud signed by N5 to
S. When N5 is not aware of S, then N5 constructs a Cself
and notiﬁes S that it wants to make a certiﬁcate exchange
via multiple node-disjoint paths, i.e. through (N5–N1–S) &
(N5–N4–S) & (N5–N8–N7–S). If N5 already has a route to
D in its cache, then it informs D that S has requested its kpud
and it responds to query and requests a certiﬁcate for kpus. If
D is unaware of adequate number of nodes, it replies to
REQcert itself. S repeats the above process by increasing the
TTL value until it obtains the minimum number of certiﬁ-
cates for kpud.Figure 2 Certiﬁcate exchange.3.3. Overall algorithm
The entire process of the proposed technique is described using
the following algorithm.
Step 01––Network Architecture
The architecture for self-organized key management tech-
nique is constructed such that it includes a coordinator node,
servers and normal mobile nodes. The coordinator acts as a
mediator node for transmitting messages from normal mobile
nodes to the servers.
Step 02––Public/Private Key Generation
Each mobile node generates its own public/private key
pairs using server-signed public keying technique. The coordi-
nator node helps in generating the publicly-recoverable public
key for any node Ni without the knowledge of the subsequent
private key. The coordinator node acts as a distributed trusted
authority. It combines the shares of (t+ 1) servers for com-
puting signature parameter.
Step 03––Trust Calculation
The nodes in the network are validated using the trust man-
agement technique named as Eigen Vector Reputation Cen-
trality technique.
Step 04––Multi-Path Certiﬁcate Exchange
After the generation of public/private key pairs, multi-path
certiﬁcate exchange technique is employed where public key of
the nodes is certiﬁed by different nodes. The authentication is
also performed mutually.
Step 05––Malicious Node Detection
Source will collect the certiﬁers of the destination node and
all possible paths to the destination. It then collects the trust
value Trij, of the nodes included in the all offered paths. Trmin
represents the minimum threshold value of trust. The mini-
mum threshold value depends on the total number of nodes
and the adjacency matrix of the network. A normal node must
have a trust value Trij, higher than the threshold minimum
Trmin, of the network (i.e. Trij > Trmin).
Step 06––Path Selection
Among the obtained paths, source selects a path that is
having more certiﬁers of the destination node. After selecting
the path, source and destination certify their public keys each
other.
4. Simulation results
4.1. Simulation model and parameters
Simulations were performed using Network Simulator (NS-2)
[15], particularly popular in the ad hoc networking commu-
nity. The MAC layer protocol IEEE 802.11 with a data rate
Table 1 Simulation settings.
No. of nodes 100
Area size 1000 · 1000
Mac 802.11
Radio range 250 m
Simulation time 100–500 s
Routing protocol AOMDV
Traﬃc source CBR
Packet size 512
Speed 5 m/s
Pause time 5 s
Load 1000–5000 Kb
No. of attackers 10
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Figure 3 No. of connections vs certiﬁcate exchange delay.
Self-organized key management 167of 11 Mbps is used in all simulations. The transmission range is
set to 250 m. The propagation model is Two Ray Ground. The
total number of nodes is set to 100 nodes in 1000 m · 1000 m
network area. In our simulation, the minimal speed is 5 m/s.
The source-destination pairs are spread randomly over the net-
work. The ns-2 Constant Bit-Rate (CBR) trafﬁc generator is
used to set up the connection patterns with different random
seeds. Each node has one CBR trafﬁc connection with a single
unique destination. Sources initiation time is uniformly distrib-
uted over the ﬁrst 60 s of the simulation time. We vary the load
value as 50, 100, 150, 200 and 250 Kb.
The size of certiﬁcates was also set to 512 bytes. The total
number of connections in the network was set to 20 connec-
tions. The Ad Hoc On-demand Multipath Distance Vector
(AOMDV) routing protocol was chosen for the simulations.
The simulation results are the average of 10 runs. The pro-
posed technique was easily integrated into the AOMDV proto-
col’s route discovery mechanism.
In the simulation, attacks are simulated where the attacker
nodes send spurious certiﬁcates to the nodes, which have
requested for those certiﬁcates. These attacks can be isolated
attacks where every attacker certiﬁes a different public key.
However, the attackers may also launch a cooperative attack
where a group of attackers collude and send certiﬁcations for
the same public key that is spurious. Both these types of
attacks––isolated and collusion––are simulated. The percent-
age of attacker nodes is ﬁxed as 10% of the total number
of nodes in the network (i.e.) 10 attackers. Node initialization
at the network bootstrapping phase is also simulated. It is
shown that each node has successfully executed the initializa-
tion step by exchanging requisite number of certiﬁcates with
the honest nodes in the network. Initial trust value of 0.75
is assigned to a node that is authenticated during the initial-
ization step, while other nodes are assumed to have a trust
value of 0.5. The full trust value is assumed to be 1. The ini-
tial trust value is chosen more than half of the full trust value
and other nodes trust values are chosen half of the full trust
value.
Our simulation settings and parameters are summarized in
Table 1.
4.2. Performance metrics
We compare the proposed Self-Organized Key Management
with Trusted Certiﬁcate (SOKMTC) technique with On-
demand Self-Organized Public Key Management (SOPKM)
scheme of [8]. We select SOPKM among the existing works,
since it is the latest work, which deals self-organized key man-
agement along with certiﬁcate chains and simulates in NS-2.
We evaluate mainly the performance according to the fol-
lowing metrics:
 Security Cost: It is the product number of certiﬁcates
exchanged into certiﬁcate size and is represented in Mbits/
sec.
 Certiﬁcate Exchange Delay: It is the interval between the
time a request is sent for a certiﬁcate and the time when
the certiﬁcate is accepted as valid.
 Average end-to-end delay: The end-to-end-delay is averaged
over all surviving data packets from the sources to the
destinations. Average Packet Delivery Ratio: It is the ratio of the number
of packets received successfully and the total number of
packets transmitted.
 Fraction of node compromise: Here we are going to calculate
how a node capture affects the rest of network resilience. It
is calculated by estimating the fraction of communications
compromised by a capture of x-nodes.
 Miss Detection Ratio: It is the ratio of number of attacks
not detected to the total number of attacks.
 Packet Drop It is the number of packets dropped during the
transmission.
4.2.1. Based on number of connections
The most frequent communication is the acquisition of partial
signatures, at least K per communicating node, in order to cre-
ate the complete signature. Consequently, the time needed for
the certiﬁcation process to come to an end should not be very
long. This way, the users can receive a satisfactory level of ser-
vice without having to waste enough time waiting for failed
requests for certiﬁcation.
Figs. 3 and 4 depict the delay and security cost involved in
the process of certiﬁcate exchange by each pair of source and
destinations. The number of connections (source and destina-
tion pairs) is varied from 2 to 10, and corresponding delay and
cost for the two schemes are measured.
It is observed that the certiﬁcate exchange delay and the
security cost increase rapidly as the number of connections
increases, as more number of intermediate nodes will be
involved in certiﬁcate exchange. However, for SOKMTC, the
delay is less by 43% and cost is reduced by 52%, when com-
pared to SOPKM.
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Figure 4 No. of connections vs security cost.
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Figure 8 Load vs fraction of node compromise.
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Figure 5 Load vs delay.
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Figure 6 Load vs packet delivery ratio.
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Figure 7 Load vs drop.
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Figure 9 Load vs misdetection ratio.
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Figure 10 Time vs delay.
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Figure 11 Time vs delivery ratio.
168 S.P John, P. Samuel4.2.2. Based on load
In our ﬁrst experiment, we vary the load as 50, 100, 150, 200,
250 Kb.
Fig. 5 shows the average end-to-end delay of both the tech-
niques, when the load is increased from 1000 kb to 5000 kb.
We can see that the delay increased linearly as the load
increases. But the delay of our proposed SOKMTC is less by
20%, than the existing SOPKM scheme.
The CBR data packets dropped due to the attackers and the
packet delivery ratio are presented in Figs. 7 and 6, respectively.
As the load increases, more data packets ﬂow into the network,
causing more packet drops. But SOKMTC has 26% less packet
drops when compared to SOPKM. Since the packet drop is lin-
early increasing, the packet delivery ratio is decreasing, as wecan see from Fig. 6. SOKMTC has 15% increases in packet
delivery ratio, when compared to SOPKM.
The results of fraction of node compromise against node
capture are shown in Fig. 8. Because of the multipath certiﬁcate
exchange based authentication, the number of compromised
nodes is less in SOKMTC. Hence it is 26% lesser for SOKMTC
than SOPKM.
The results of miss detection ratio are shown in Fig. 9.
Because of the direct trust value estimation based on the cen-
trality measure, the miss detection ratio is less for SOKMTC.
Hence the resilience of proposed SOKMTC is 11.9% lesser
than SOPKM.
4.2.3. Based on time
In our second experiment, we vary the simulation stop time as
100, 200, 300, 400 and 500 s.
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Figure 12 Time vs drop.
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Figure 13 Time vs fraction of node compromise.
Self-organized key management 169From Fig. 10, we can see that the end-to-end delay
increases as the time increases from 10 to 50 s. The delay
occurred in the proposed SOKMTC is less than 9.3% of the
SOPKM scheme.
The results of packets dropped and the packet delivery ratio
are presented in Figs. 12 and 11, respectively. As the time
increases, more packets are dropped. SOKMTC has 22% less
packet drops when compared to SOPKM. We can see from
Fig. 12 that SOKMTC has 16% increases in packet delivery
ratio, when compared to SOPKM.
The results of fraction of node compromise against node
capture are shown in Fig. 13. Because of the multipath certif-
icate exchange based authentication, the number of compro-
mised nodes is less in SOKMTC. Hence the resilience of
proposed SOKMTC is 36% lesser than SOPKM.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a self-organized key manage-
ment technique coupled with trusted certiﬁcate exchange tech-
nique for mobile ad hoc network. The proposed architecture
consists of the coordinator node, servers and ordinary mobile
nodes. The coordinator acts as mediator for transmitting the
message among the servers and mobile nodes. Each node gener-
ates its own public/private key pairs using server-signed public
keying technique. The coordinator node helps in generating the
publicly-recoverable public key for any node Ni without the
knowledge of the subsequent private key. The nodes that issued
the certiﬁcates are validated using the trust management mech-
anism. The trust value is computed using the Eigen Vector Rep-
utation Centrality. Then multi-path certiﬁcate exchange
technique is employed where public key of the nodes is certiﬁed
by different nodes. As a result of multiple independent certiﬁca-
tions, the conﬁdence assigned to the certiﬁcates is higher. As a
future enhancement we will include the certiﬁcation revocation
mechanism to this multipath technique.References
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